Privacy Paradox(es): In Search of a Transatlantic Data Protection Standard by Marcinkowski, Bartosz M.
Privacy Paradox(es):
In Search of a Transatlantic Data Protection
Standard
BARTOSZ M. MARCINKOWSKI*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1167
II. THE TRANSATLANTIC DEBATE. .............................. 1168
A. The Significance of the Issue ................. ..... 1169
B. Terminology ...................... ..... ...... 1171
C. The Axiological Basis ofNormative Regulations:
The Euro-Atlantic Community of Values .............. 1175
1. OECD Guidelines ..................... ..... 1175
2. HEWReport ......................... ..... 1178
3. Comparison ofFIPPs Outlined in the HEWReport
and in the OECD Guidelines ................... 1179
D. Systemic Differences ................................. 1183
1. Statutory Law Sources in the Area ofPersonal
Data Protection and Informational Privacy:
A Model Approach ..................... ..... 1183
2. Regulation Methods in the Model Approach ... ..... 1185
3. Evaluation ofRegulation Methods in the Model
Approach ........................ ..... 1187
4. Reasons Behind Regulatory Differences ...... ...... 1188
a. Privacy Paradox No. 1......... ... ......... 1190
b. Privacy Paradox No. 2...................... 1190
III. IN SEARCH OF CONVERGENCE: A GLOBAL VISION OF
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION. ........................ ...... 1192
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I will examine a phenomenon that I refer to as the privacy
paradox (or paradoxes, as I identify several of them). This phenomenon appears
in the Euro-Atlantic discussion on privacy and personal data protection.
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The Poles, more than any other nation [had the misfortune of experiencing] the
most audacious and complex versions of obsessions with projects of a perfect
society-the one-thousand-year Third Reich and the gardens of Eden of
communism ... [The Poles know] what it is like to live in a society-garden,
with state as gardener.'
As a Pole, I feel inclined to take part in discussion on the issue at hand.
There is another reason why the analysis of the European and American
personal data protection systems carried out from the perspective of a Polish
researcher is particularly attractive. And that is the fact that the Polish Personal
Data Protection Act of 19972 is virtually a word-for-word transposition of the
EU Data Protection Directive of 1995.3 Hence the Polish regulation reveals and
puts to a test the intentions of the EU legislator.
My aim is to follow the principles of comparative legal doctrine in an
attempt to avoid falling into the EU- or U.S.-centrism trap.
As mentioned, this Article will focus on comparative research from the
perspective of a European legal practitioner with close to twenty years of
professional experience in Poland-an EU member state and a vital European
and global center for business support services, which entails intensive data
transfers to and from Poland.
In my Paper I will (i) introduce the issue at hand, (ii) define basic
terminology, (iii) discuss the axiological basis of the European and American
regulations, (iv) describe systemic differences between them, (v) present
evolutionary tendencies of both legal systems, and (vi) outline a proposed
method of convergence.
II. THE TRANSATLANTIC DEBATE
The axis of the argument prevailing in the EU is that the American legal
system does not ensure an adequate (from EU legal perspective) degree of
personal data protection, which results in significant limitations to transfers of
data from the European Union (including Poland) to the United States. I
therefore adopt, as a working hypothesis, a widely held stance that European
regulations, particularly the EU Data Protection Directive, are the point of
reference for comparisons and analyses. In practice, this assumption results in
promoting the European standards as a benchmark for assessing the
effectiveness of other, non-European informational privacy systems. At the
same time, the test of adequacy of data protection in non-European countries is
1 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, CIALO I PRZEMOC W OBLICZU PONOWOCZESNOSCI [BODY AND
VIOLENCE IN THE FACE OF POSTMODERNITY] 21 (1995) (translation provided by author).
2 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie danych osobowych [Polish Data
Protection Act of 1997] (1997 r. Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 883 as amended).
3 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter EU Data Protection
Directive] (on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data).
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complex, contextual, and holistic, referring to the circumstances of data
processing in its entirety.4 Such nature of the tests results in a lack of uniformity
of the criteria applied and an unclear hierarchy thereof.
The above observations do not imply that the said principles and minimum
data security requirements established by the EU legislator constitute an
absolute and indisputable global standard for personal data protection. At the
same time, however, as noted correctly by Colin J. Bennett and Charles D.
Raab, European personal data protection standards are exported from Europe to
other parts of the world, including the United States (which from the
perspective of other civilizational phenomena is not a typical or obvious
direction). 5 We can therefore talk about the California Effect A rebours. 6
Nevertheless, both the European Union and the United States clearly express
their determination to map out the ultimate global standard on privacy and
personal data protection, each of them in accordance with their own conceptual
model.7 Both actors in the Transatlantic debate (i.e. the EU and the United
States) adopt a stance that their respective data protection instruments-that is,
a precise, explicit, and specific public-law regulation in Europe, and flexible,
pro-market, based on self-regulating free-market principles, segmented, sector
regulation in the United States-should prevail.8
A. The Significance of the Issue
There are no doubts over the significance of the issue of privacy
(informational privacy) protection in today's world dominated by the Internet
and phenomena such as Big Data and Open Source.9 Personal data has become
4 1d. arts. 25-26, at 45-46; 1997 r. Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 883 as amended. See generally
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data, Working Document: Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles
25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, DG XV D/5025/98, WP 12 (July 24, 1998),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1998/wpl2_en.pdf
5 COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 114 (2006).
6 SEBASTIAAN PRINCEN, EU REGULATION AND TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 5-6 (2002).
European Council, The Stockholm Programme-An Open and Secure Europe
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. (C 115) 1, 11; THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER
DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 31-33 (2012) [hereinafter
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
privacy-final.pdf; see also PETER P. SwIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 21
(1998).
8 See Priscilla M. Regan, American Business and the European Data Protection
Directive: Lobbying Strategies and Tactics, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR
THE DIGITAL AGE 199, 212 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999).
9 See Case C-138/l1, Compass-Datenbank GmbH v. Republik Osterreich, 2011 EUR-
Lex CELEX LEXIS 0138 (July 12, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document_print.j sf?doclang-EN&text-&pagelndex=0&part- &mode=req&doci
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a tangible asset in such a world. As noted by Alan F. Westin, privacy-
including personal data-some fifty years ago constituted a "third-tier social,
political, and legal issue."10 Nowadays, civilizational advances are linked to
information processing, hence privacy and personal data protection have
become paramount issues in the world governed and driven by modern
technologies."
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the value of trade between the
EU and United States was estimated at some USD 120 billion at both ends.12
According to the EU Digital Agenda, paradoxically "Europeans often find it
easier to conduct a cross-border [Internet] transaction with U.S. business than
with one from another European country,"' 3 while data on EU consumer
behavior and preferences have been available in the United States for years.14
Still, according to a widely held belief in Europe, personal data is not
adequately protected in the United States.
Nonetheless, limiting the issue of informational privacy protection to a
strict commercial sphere, in my opinion, oversimplifies and trivializes the issue.
I believe that the issue of informational privacy, in a way, determines the degree
d=124999&occ=first&dir-&cid=6123250; TERENCE CRAIG & MARY E. LUDLOFF, PRIVACY
AND BIG DATA 4 (2011); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013);
Christopher Kuner et al., The Challenge of "Big Data" for Data Protection, 2 INT'L DATA
PRIVACY L., May 2012, 47, 47-48 (2012); Bartosz Marcinkowski & Sylwia Kuca, Incydent
czy znak czasu? [An Incident or a Sign of the Times?], RZECZPOSPOLITA PRAWO (Mar. 14,
2013, 11:07 AM), http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/989792.html (translation provided by author);
Compliance News Updates, PDP (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.pdpemail.com/compliance
19032013/.
10 Alan F. Westin, How Important Is Privacy Today?, IAPP (Dec. 17, 2012),
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2012_12_17-how-important-isprivacyto
day.
I 1 See Daniel J. Solove, A BrieffHistory on Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 1:1
(Kristen J. Matthews ed., 2006); Marek Safjan, Prawo do prywatnoci i ochrona danych
osobowych w spoleczeristwie informatycznym [The Right to Privacy and Personal Data
Protection in an Information Society] 6 PAINSTWO I PRAwO 3 (2002) (translation provided by
author); Westin, supra note 10.
12 Lee A. Bygrave, International Agreements To Protect Personal Data, in GLOBAL
PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 15, 15 (James B. Rule & Graham Greenleaf
eds., 2008) (citing DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION,
THE UNITED STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 2 (2005)); see also Fred H. Cate,
The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33
IND. L. REV. 173, 179 (1999); Stephen J. Kobrin, The Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Dispute,
Territorial Jurisdiction and Global Governance 24 n.18 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=349561.
13 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital
Agenda for Europe, at 10, COM (2010) 245 final/2 (May 19, 2010).
14 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 308 (1996).
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of personal freedom of an individual and has a direct influence on the
foundations of a democratic civil society.
Threats to and the abuse of personal data (informational privacy) may come
from different directions-not only from authorities, 15 but also business entities.
It is estimated that Google performs and maintains in its archives some three
billion search queries every day; thus the data stored by Google every day has
by now become a limitless source of information about Internet users. 16 This
data can be used in a variety of ways in different political and social conditions
in order to influence individuals.
One may of course argue that the issue of personal data protection is an
intellectual exercise for developed and affluent Western societies, while
limitations to or complete loss of informational privacy is an inevitable cost of
innovation and development of a society. In my view, however, such
underestimation of the issue is improper, as it undermines the basic values that
are fundamental to a free and democratic society (this issue will be discussed
more in the latter part of this Article). Rapidly advancing technological
revolution is, paraphrasing Abraham Maslow, a catalyst of changes, from which
a new image of the human being, society, science, basic values, and philosophy
emerge, while privacy-including informational privacy in particular-is
located among basic needs, which are part of a wider need of safety (that are
placed just above basic physiological needs).17
B. Terminology
Further deliberations on the topic require some clarification and
systemization of the terminology used in the Euro-Atlantic debate, insofar as
the limitations of this Article allow. Apart from basic systemic differences
between the system of statutory law (European) and the system of common law
(United States) (more on this issue in the latter part of this Article), the
linguistic layer constitutes an additional barrier and a common source of
misconceptions or misunderstandings. Further clarification is also needed in
order to avoid the problem of comparing notions that represent values that
belong to different categories.' 8
15 An interesting case in point surfaced in the summer of 2013 when details about
PRISM-an NSA security intelligence and surveillance program, which collects data from
the systems of some of the biggest tech companies-were revealed. Glenn Greenwald &
Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others,
GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-
nsa-data; see A. Michael Froomkin, "PETs Must Be on a Leash": How US. Law (and
Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy Enhancing
Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 991-94 (2013).16 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 9.17 ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 18-20, 67-72 (3d ed. 1987).18 ROMAN TOKARCZYK, KOMPARATYSTYKA PRAWNICZA [COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES] 34 (2008) (translation provided by author).
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Up to this point I have used terms such as "personal data" and
"informational privacy." Meanwhile, the EU legislation and that of its member
states provides a precise definition of "personal data," that is: "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity."l 9 This definition is, in principle, identical to the one that appears in
the Polish Personal Data Protection Act (Article 6).20 In addition, this definition
conforms with the definition set out in Article 4(1) of the draft General Data
Protection Regulation, 21 which, according to a proposed reform of the EU legal
system,22 is intended to replace the EU Data Protection Directive, and European
national regulations. 23
In the American literature the notion of "personal data" appears in different
contexts with different intensity. For instance, a definition similar to the
European definition is used by the authors of a government document,
Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy.2 4 In this
document, personal data is defined as any information, including aggregated
information (connected to other information) that is linkable to a specific
individual, including by a computer or a telephone that can be used to profile a
person, even when such a computer or a telephone is not used exclusively by
one individual. 25 Prior to that, similar definitions appeared also at the working
stage on the federal Privacy Act of 1974, during which the notion of "personal
information" was used to mean:
[A]ny information about the individual that identifies or describes any
characteristic including but not limited to education, financial transactions,
medical history, criminal or employment record, or any personal information
19 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(a), at 38.20 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie danych osobowych [Polish Data
Protection Act of 1997] (1997 r. Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 883 as amended).
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 41, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012).
22Id
23 A directive needs to be implemented in each EU member state, allowing each
national legislator to adopt their own measures in order to achieve the intended result. A
regulation becomes part of all national legislations, ensuring full uniformity of legal norms
across all EU member states. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 88-89 (2010).2 4 CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY, supra note 7, at 10.25 1d at 10 n.12. Sometimes the expression "personally identifiable information" (PII)
is used in govemment documents, in a sense that in principle is identical to the definition
above. Id.
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that affords a basis for inferring personal characteristics such as finger and
voice prints, photographs, or things done by or to such individual. Such
definition includes the record or present registration, or membership in an
organization or activity, or admission to an institution. It is intended to include
within these terms any symbol, number, such as a social security number or
character, address, by which the individual is indexed in a file or retrievable
from it.26
The above does not change the fact that a central notion connected with the
field labeled in Europe as "personal data protection" is denominated as
"privacy" in the United States.27
The notion of "privacy" is, however, significantly wider in its scope than
the notion of "personal data," which becomes apparent as dozens of "privacy"
subcategories emerge in literature on the subject. 28 Among the most important I
would include "decisional privacy," 29 "physical privacy" (also referred to as
"spatial"/"territorial privacy"), 30 as well as "informational privacy," which I
will discuss in more detail, below.
The decoding of "privacy" is subjective and dependent on complex social,
cultural, historical, and even geographical factors,31 although some scholars
believe that there is an internal "value order" that would indicate which areas of
privacy should remain unconditionally sacred and inviolable. 32 Nevertheless, it
26 S. REP. No. 93-1183, at 78-79 (1974).
27 What is referred to in Europe as "personal data protection," in American literature is
often linked with intellectual property rights or security measures in IT systems. SCHWARTZ
& REIDENBERG, supra note 14, at 5-6.
28 A Polish researcher, Krzysztof Motyka, identified over 120 subcategories of
"privacy" in American literature, classified according to a variety of different criteria.
Krzysztof Motyka, Prawo do prywatnoci [The Right to Privacy], in 2 ZEszYTY NAUKOWE
AKADEMII PODLASKIEJ w SIEDLCACH 9, 25-34 (2010) (Pol.) (translation provided by author).
29 William A. Edmundson, Privacy, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 271, 272-73 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds.,
2005); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
3 0 See PETER P. SwIRE & KENESA AHMAD, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION PRIVACY
AND DATA PROTECTION: A SURVEY OF GLOBAL CONCEPTS, LAWS AND PRACTICES 2 (Terry
McQuay ed., 2012).
31 See CRAIG & LUDLOFF, supra note 9, at 15; MASLOW, supra note 17, at 212-13 (on
changing social conventions and their cultural and geographical variations); WITOLD
RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 28 (1986); James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1155, 1159
(2004).
32 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 759 (1989); see
also MARC ANCEL, ZNACZENIE I METODY PRAWA POROWNAWCZEGO [THE IMPORTANCE AND
METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW] 32-33 (1979) (translation provided by author); Marek
Safjan, Refleksfe wokol konstytucyjnych uwarunkowah rozwoju ochrony dobr osobistych
[Reflections on Constitutional Determinants for the Development of Personal Data
Protection], in XI KWARTALNIK PRAWA PRYWATNEGO 223, 243 (2002) (translation provided
by author); Mikolaj Wild, Ochrona prywatnoici w prawie cywilnym [Privacy Protection in
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is impossible to indicate the sacred and inviolable boundary of privacy in an a
priori defined set of circumstances. 33 Hence the conclusion that the notion of
privacy remains difficult to define. 34
Even more so, it is necessary to extract a subcategory of privacy in
accordance with its usage in the United States in order to be able to compare it
with the European notion of personal data protection. To this end, a subcategory
of "personal privacy" seems appropriate. It appears, among other sources, in the
American Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens report of the
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, drawn
up for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.35 The report
defines "personal privacy" as the right of individuals and/or organizations to
decide which information about them may be transferred to other parties.36
However, in the American literature, the notion used most often with reference
to the protection of information with regard to individuals (personal data
protection) is "informational privacy," 37 which comes down to "control over
personal information" 38 (hence it is often referred to as "disclosural privacy,"
which in my opinion narrows it down excessively) 39 and "privacy" with regard
to "personal information." 40 From this perspective, a definition proposed by
Alan F. Westin, referring to the right of individuals to control, edit, manage, and
delete information about themselves and decide when, how, and to what extent
information is communicated to others seems quite appropriate. 41
Taking into consideration the above, further deliberations should refer to
legal mechanisms used for "personal data protection" in the European Union,
Civil Law] (Koncepcja sfer a prawo podmiotowe), in 4 PANSTWO I PRAwO 54, 56 (2001)
(translation provided by author).
33 Wild, supra note 32, at 66.
34 MARIUSZ JAGIELSKI, PRAWO DO OCHRONY DANYCH OSOBOWYCH: STANDARDY
EUROPEJSKIE [THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION: EUROPEAN STANDARDS] 22-23
(2010) (translation provided by author); Whitman, supra note 31, at 1153.
3 5 SEC'Y'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA Sys., DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 40-41
(1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT].
36 See id.
37 Edmundson, supra note 29, at 272.
3 8 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 44-45 (2d ed. 2009); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1087, 1109 (2002); see also SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 30, at 2.
39 See Todd Robert Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy?
An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 957, 962-63 (1991);
Timothy 0. Lenz, "Rights Talk" About Privacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1613, 1624
(1997); Motyka, supra note 28, at 27 n.123 (citing Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1283 (1975)).40 BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 5, at xv.
41 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
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and "informational privacy protection" in the United States.42 These two
categories are the closest, if not identical, in their meaning and usage. They are
also widely used in the literature on the subject matter.
C. The Axiological Basis ofNormative Regulations: The Euro-Atlantic
Community of Values
My thesis is that the core values that personal data protection regulation
seeks to enshrine are very similar, if not identical, in both the United States and
in Europe. 43 Personal data (informational privacy) protection is not a goal in
itself, but rather, as I set out in the introduction, is of instrumental value, that is,
it constitutes one of the cornerstones of a modem democratic society and a
significant determinant of individual freedom. Reaching the goal is achieved by
ensuring the observance of elementary rules of conduct with regard to personal
data processing, which, based on the American literature, I refer to as Fair
Information Privacy Practices (FIPPs).44 I therefore focus on the documents that
thus far played an important role in establishing FIPPs, such as the OECD
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data (OECD Guidelines), adopted by the OECD in 1980,45 and the
conclusions of the HEW Report of 1973.46
1. OECD Guidelines
It is a widely held belief that the OECD Guidelines provided a model for
modem principles for personal data protection by outlining FIPPs. In spite of
42 1 use this term, along with other variations, such as "informational privacy" and "data
privacy."
4 3 See, e.g., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GRP. Six, FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER DISCOVERY CONFLICTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NAVIGATING
THE COMPETING CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY AND E-DISCOVERY app. C
(2008), available at https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/Framework%20for/ 20
Analysis%20ofo20Cross-Border/o20Discovery%20Conflicts.
44I would like to emphasize two points: (i) the notion of FIPPs/FIPs is not widely used
in European literature; (ii) for the purpose of this Article, I will use "data processing" in the
European sense, that is "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction." EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(b), at 38.
4 5 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, C(80)(58)/FINAL (Sept. 23, 1980)
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines], available at http://www.oecd.org/intemet/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm; see also
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & DANIEL J. SOLOVE, INFORMATION PRIVACY: STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS 2010-2011, at 593 (2010).
46 HEW REPORT, supra note 35, at xix-xxxv.
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their non-binding character (they are of indicative value only),47 the OECD
Guidelines have been developed in a creative manner-by being both further
clarified/specified and implemented (the most clear expression of which was the
adoption, among others, of the Convention No. 108 of the Council of Europe in
198148 and the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995), as well as simplified and
treated as the foundation of framework regulations. 49 In addition, the global
significance of the OECD Guidelines is highlighted by the fact that they were
recognized by the United States, which is of particular importance from the
point of view of striving for a universal model/framework for regulating
personal data protection.
The OECD Guidelines emphasize the need to reconcile the protection of
privacy and individual freedom with the free flow of information.50 They also
contain the definition of transborder flows of personal data,51 setting out
detailed instructions on ensuring the free flow of personal data among countries
that accepted the Guidelines or adopted them, as well as indications on the
scope of reasonable restrictions to free flow of data.52
The OECD Guidelines are based on several basic principles (FIPPs):
Collection Limitation Principle . .. There should be limits to the collection
of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
Data Quality Principle . . . Personal data should be relevant to the purposes
for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes,
should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
Purpose Specification Principle ... The purposes for which personal data
are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such
others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each
occasion of change of purpose.
47 JANusz BARTA ET AL., OCHRONA DANYCH OSOBOWYCH. KOMENTARZ [PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION: A COMMENTARY] 102 (2007) (translation provided by author); MARIUSZ
POLOK, BEZPIECZENSTWO DANYCH OSOBOWYCH [PERSONAL DATA SECURITY] 30 (2008)
(translation provided by author).
48 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108.
49 See ASIA-PAC. ECON. Coop., APEC PRIVACY FRAMEwORK 4 (2004), available at
http://inicio.ifai.org.mx/Documentosdelnteres/APECPrivacyFramework(Oct-2004).pdf;
Graham Greenleaf, The APEC Privacy Initiative: "OECD Lite" for the Asia-Pacific?, 10
PRIVACY L. & Bus. INT'L REP., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 1.50 See generally OECD Guidelines, supra note 45.
51 See id. T 1; Omer Tene, Privacy Law's Midlfe Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the
Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2013).
52 See OECD Guidelines, supra note 45, 15-18. For more on the subject, please refer
to Bygrave, supra note 12, at 26-29; Andrew Clearwater & J. Trevor Hughes, In the
Beginning ... An Early History of the Privacy Profession, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (2013).
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Use Limitation Principle . . . Personal data should not be disclosed, made
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in
accordance with [the Purpose Specification Principle] except:
a) with the consent of the data subject; or
b) by the authority of law.
Security Safeguards Principle .. . Personal data should be protected by
reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.
Openness Principle ... There should be a general policy of openness
about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.
Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and
usual residence of the data controller.
Individual Participation Principle . .. Individuals should have the right:
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not
the data controller has data relating to them;
b) to have communicated to them, data relating to them
i. within a reasonable time;
ii. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
iii. in a reasonable manner; and
iv. in a form that is readily intelligible to them;
c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is
denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have
the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.
Accountability Principle . .. A data controller should be accountable for
complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.53
I consider that the above rules should be supplemented by the requirement
of establishing an independent body dedicated to personal data protection. I
should emphasize, however, that such requirement is one of the options
prescribed by the OECD Guidelines in order to enforce adherence to FIPPs in
practice. The Guidelines suggest "establish[ing] legal, administrative or other
procedures or institutions for the protection of privacy and individual liberties
in respect of personal data."5 4 Consequently, pursuant to the EU Data Protection
Directive, while implementing it into their respective legal systems, legislators
in EU member states established independent personal data protection bodies.
For instance, in Poland, the Inspector General for Personal Data Protection
(GIODO), with supervisory and investigative powers, is elected by the Polish
Parliament for a four-year term.55
53 OECD Guidelines, supra note 45, at Part 2, % 7-14, quoted in Fred H. Cate, Failure
of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
INFORMATION ECONOMY 341, 346-47 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
54 OECD Guidelines, supra note 45, Part 4, 19 (emphasis added).
55 Poland Data Protection Authority, CEECPRIVACY.ORG, http://www.ceecprivacy.org/
main.php?s=2&k=poland (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
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2. HEWReport
The evaluation of the OECD Guidelines would be incomplete if the role of
the HEW Report,56 particularly with reference to FIPPs set out in it, were
omitted. I dedicate special attention to the said Report, particularly because its
role in the ongoing debate is, in my opinion, underestimated. The influence of
the HEW Report is important on several levels and is connected with the timing
of the report, the beginning of the 1970s. 57 Although, just as the OECD
Guidelines, the HEW Report is a non-binding document, it had a profound
impact on the way of thinking about personal data protection, not only in the
United States (particularly with reference to the Privacy Act of 1974),58 but also
on the global scale. In my opinion, the HEW Report is an element of the
intellectual basis for the OECD Guidelines and reveals a potential framework
for legal regulations that is acceptable in the United States. The set of FIPPs
presented in the HEW Report encompasses the following principles 59:
"There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very
existence is secret." 60 This principle emphasizes the importance of public and
individual awareness of the existence of data administrators, as well as data sets
maintained by them and data processing systems.
"There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used." 61 This principle is identified with the
requirement to provide information about individuals that the data concerns, a
proper notice about data processing and the manner in which they are
processed.62 Analogously to the first principle, it highlights the need to provide
reliable information to the individual concerned. In addition, this principle
imposes the need to ensure procedural measures to comply with the principle.
"There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent." 63 This principle is also referred to as the
"principle of finality" and is connected with the "right of choice."
56 HEW REPORT, supra note 35.
57 The HEW Report was published only three years after the adoption of the first
personal data protection act in the world in the German State of Hessen in 1970. See
Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz [Hessian Data Protection Act], promulgated Oct. 12, 1970,
HESSISCHEs GESETZ- UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT [HESS GVBL.] at 625 (Hessen) (Ger.). In
1973 Sweden also adopted its personal data protection act. DATALAG [DATA STORAGE]
(Svensk firfattningssamling [SFS] 1973:289) (Swed.).
58 See James B. Rule, Introduction, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST
GENERATION, supra note 12, at 4-6.
59 Cate, supra note 53, at 343-44.
60 HEW REPORT, supra note 35, at xx.6 1 Id
62 See Ray Everett-Church, Privacy Law and the Internet, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES IN
INFORMATION SECURITY: LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 411-12 (Hossein
Bidgoli ed., 2009).
63 HEW REPORT, supra note 35, at xx.
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"There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him" 64 (from which, the "right of access" arises).
"Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the
data"65 (connected with broadly defined accountability). In addition, such
organizations are required not only to apply measures to ensure security of the
data, but also to prevent misuse and inappropriate processing of the data
("reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data" 66). I would therefore be
tempted to put forth a thesis that this particular FIPP requires personal data
processing entities to act in accordance with fair information practice.
The authors of the HEW Report considered recommending both the
establishment of an ombudsman office for personal data protection, as well as a
separate federal agency dedicated to data protection; in the end, however, they
abandoned this idea altogether. Nevertheless, the interpretation of Section 5 of
the FTC Act from the 1990s has consequently resulted in the Federal Trade
Commission adopting a de facto role of a personal data protection body.67 I
must point out, however, serious legal limitations to the FTC mandate, which
allows the agency to act on informational privacy protection breaches only in
the case of violations to fair competition. 68 In spite of this, however, I would
like to point out the significant systemic measure that brought the American
federal model closer to the European one in the systemic and functional aspects.
3. Comparison ofFIPPs Outlined in the HEWReport and in the OECD
Guidelines
A comparison of the FIPPs outlined in the OECD Guidelines and in the
HEW Report is, in my opinion, justified, given that it concerns fundamental
documents that reveal the system of values protected by ultimate regulation.
Table 1 highlights many similarities between the two documents:
64 Id.
65 Id. at xxi.66 Id. at 41.
67 See generally Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. [EPIC], to
Christine Varney, Comnm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Dec. 14, 1995), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/ftc_letter.html; Memorandum from Paul M. Schwartz &
Daniel Solove on The FTC's Role in Privacy Protection: Implications for Food & Beverage
Marketing to NPLAN Mktg. to Children Learning Cmty. (June 29, 2009), available at
http://changelabsolutions.org/sites/default/files/documents/FTCand-Privacy.pdf.
6 8 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS ix, 73 (2012).
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Table 1: Comparison ofHEWReport and OECD Guidelines
Corresponding FIPPs Set out inFIPPs Outlined in the HEW ReportthOEDGiens 6
the OECD Guidelines69
a.) Collection Limitation
a.) "Principle of finality" connected with b.) the Principle, b.) Purpose
principle of "right of choice" Specification Principle, and c.)
Use Limitation Principle
Reliability of the data Data Quality Principle
a.) Principle stipulating the use of reasonable
precautions to prevent misuse of the data,
connected with b.) the requirement to implement Security Safeguards Principle
data safety measures and c.) accountability of the
entity processing the data
a.) Principle stipulating that there must be no
personal-data record-keeping systems whose very
existence is secret; b.) principle that there must be
a way for an individual to find out what
information about him/her is in a record and how it a.) Openness Principle and b.)
is used; c.) there must be a way for an individual to Individual Participation Principle
correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about him/her (which entails the "right
of access"); and d.) the above-mentioned "right of
choice" principle
Broadly defined principle of accountability
(connected with the above-mentioned principle of Accountability Principle
the use of reasonable precautions to prevent
misuse of the data)
Table 1 should also, in my opinion, be supplemented with the requirement
of establishing a personal data protection office/agency, as is already the case in
EU member states (for example, Inspector General for Personal Data Protection
in Poland) and, to some extent, in the United States.70
The comparison of the principles contained in the two documents-the
HEW Report and the OECD Guidelines-allows us to draw the following
conclusions. First of all, there is no full agreement on the scope of principles
and their systematics. Second of all, there are no evident contradictions among
FIPPs from both groups. Third, each general principle can be identified in both
documents. Fourth, given that the OECD Guidelines constitute an axiological
source for the EU Data Protection Directive, while at the same time, they derive
from the HEW Report, one cannot put forth a thesis that the FIPPs adopted by
691 use the term "corresponding," given that the FIPPs are not identical, but rather
similar or related, taking into consideration their aims.70 See my comments on the role of the FTC, supra Part II.C.2.
1180 [Vol. 74:6
PRIVACY PARADOX(ES)
the European Union stand in absolute contradiction to the American legal
system and culture. It is quite the opposite, as evidenced by the chronology of
the documents and the FIPPs principles contained therein.
Although the immediate goal of FIPPs is ensuring adequate protection for
personal data processed in accordance with norms implementing FIPPs to a
given legal system, their intermediate and ultimate goal is protection of
fundamental values in a democratic society. The similarity of the FIPPs
contained in the HEW Report and the OECD Guidelines is proof that both
cultures-European and American-consider similar principles as a guarantee
for these values.
By fundamental democratic values I refer to individual freedom, including
freedom from unlawful or unreasonable government interference in people's
lives, 71 freedom from interference of any other third parties, 72 freedom of
expression,73 as well as the broadly defined principles of individual autonomy
and freedom, including the freedom of information. 74 It is therefore paramount
to guarantee an individual the right to personality, the right to decide about
his/her life (decisional autonomy),75 the right to self-reflection, self-fulfillment,
self-determination, self-evaluation, individuality and self-development, 76 and to
ensure an individual the full right to the "shaping of personality and decision-
71 See, e.g., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution], Dz.U. 1997. Nr 78,
poz. 483 (as amended), Art. 41, Rozdzial II (Pol.), translated at The Constitution of the
Republic of Poland, SEJM.Gov, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/konl.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72 See, e.g., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1997. Nr 78, poz. 483 (as
amended), Art. 47, Rozdzial II (Pol.); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193, 195, 205 (1890) (discussing American
legislation and legal doctrine constructed on the basis of the "right to be left alone").
73 See, e.g., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1997. Nr 78, poz. 483 (as
amended), Art. 54 Rozdzial II (POl.); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74 See generally WESTIN, supra note 41, at 24-26; Andrzej Kopff, Koncepcja praw do
intymnoici i do prywatnoici zycia osobistego (zagadnienia konstrukcyjne) [The Conception
of the Right to Intimacy and Privacy of Life (Constructive Issues)], 20 STUDIA
CYWILISTYCZNE (1972) (translation provided by author); Irena Lipowicz, Konstytucyjne
podstawy ochrony danych osobowych [Constitutional Basis for Personal Data Protection],
in OCHRONA DANYCH OSOBOWYCH W POLSCE Z PERSPEKTYWY DZIESICIOLECIA [PERSONAL
DATA PROTECTION IN POLAND FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE LAST DECADE] (Pawel
Fajgielski ed., 2008) (quoting Wyrok [judgment] TK [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] z [of]
Nov. 12, 2002, SK 40/01 (OTK-A 2002, Nr 6, poz. 81)) (translation provided by author);
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 72.
75 Safjan, supra note 32, at 233.
7 6 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906, 1911 (2013);
see also LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC
AND LIMITS 133-35 (2002); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way
To Think About Your Data than "Privacy," ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:55 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-
about-your-data-than-privacy/267283/; Jathan Sadowski, Why Does Privacy Matter? One
Scholar's Answer, ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2013/02/why-does-privacy-matter-one-scholars-answer/273521/.
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making on personal matters"77 in the psychological, physical, and social
dimensions. 78 The ultimate goal is to provide conditions for the development
and proper functioning of a civil society.79
These principles, widely accepted in democratic societies, complemented
with the rule of law and shared by all legalistic cultures, constitute the Euro-
Atlantic community of values, 80 expressed, for example, in the Preamble of the
North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.81 The
Washington Treaty invokes the need to "safeguard the freedom, common
heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."82 Article 2 of the Treaty
emphasizes the need to develop peaceful and friendly international relations by
strengthening free institutions, particularly by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded. 83 The
signatories of the Treaty, including among others, the United States and Poland,
focus rightly on the proper understanding of the functioning of institutions of
their partners, pointing out that common aims of countries with different
histories, traditions, cultures (including legal), and social structures can be
achieved only in such manner. 84 As Polish author frena Lipowicz points out, the
aforementioned invocation contained in the Preamble of the Washington Treaty
refers not only to the freedom of a community (nations, societies), but also to
individual freedom; it also assumes and emphasizes the existence of a "deposit
of common values." 85 A similar stance is presented by the representatives of
American authorities that, while looking for convergence, conclude that
unchanged, fundamental values around which a transatlantic discussion evolves,
are shared by all participants in the Euro-Atlantic debate, and that the common
areas in the field of personal data protection and privacy are greater than the
77 Leslaw Kaiski, Prawo do prywatnoici, nienaruszalnoici mieszkania i tajemnicy
korespendencji [The Right to Privacy, Inviolability of Home and Secrecy of
Correspondence], in PRAWA CZLOWIEKA: MODEL PRAWNY 317, 322 (Roman Wieruszewski
ed., 1991) (translation provided by author).
78 Andrzej Kopff, Ochrona zycia prywatnego w dwietle doktryny i orzecznictwa
[Protection of Private Life in View of Doctrine and Judicature], 100 ZESZYTY NAUKOWE
UNIWERSYTETU JAGIELLONSKIEGO PRACE PRAWNICZE 37 (1982) (translation provided by
author).
79 For similar views see Aditi Bagchi, Deliberative Autonomy and Legitimate State
Purpose Under the First Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 815, 815 (2005); James E. Fleming,
Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 30-56 (1995).
80See Irena Lipowicz, NATO a wartoici [NATO and Values], in SUWERENNOk I
INTEGRACJA EUROPEJSKA, MATERIALY POKONFERENCYJNE [SOVEREIGNTY AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION, POST-CONFERENCE PUBLICATION] (Wladyslaw Czaplifiski et al. eds., 1999)
(translation provided by author).
81 North Atlantic Treaty pmbl., Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.82 Id
83 Id. art. 2.84 Id85 Lipowicz, supra note 80.
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underlying differences. 86 I will examine these differences in the section that
follows.
D. Systemic Differences
In this section I will focus on the fundamental differences between the
European (including Polish) and the American personal data and informational
privacy protection systems. Basic characteristics of the European system can be
summarized in several points. In the part that follows, I will present a model
approach, in order to subsequently evaluate the practical use and directions in
which these models evolve. At the same time, I would like to make clear that I
focus on statutory law sources, without delving into the analysis of case law
which is the basis of the common law system.
I would like to signal, however, that when evaluating the adequacy of non-
European legal systems with regard to personal data protection, vis-a-vis
European regulations, one should take into account the overall picture,
including a non-European judicature. In my opinion, this aspect is often
overlooked, given that traditionally only statutory regulations are analyzed, in
spite of the importance of legal decisions in the common law. At the same time,
I am only referring here to general regulations on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, without taking into consideration specific regulations on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent
authorities for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection, or
prosecution of criminal offences and terrorism.
1. Statutory Law Sources in the Area ofPersonal Data Protection and
Informational Privacy: A Model Approach
The European system of personal data protection adopts the principle of
compiling all norms regulating the entire area of data protection in one legal act
functioning as a sort of "constitution" for the entire field (both in public and
private sectors), with its normative basis in the highest legal acts. It is often
referred to as an omnibus regulation, covering both public and private sector
entities. At the European Union level, the regulation that is the basis for the
personal data protection system is the EU Personal Data Protection Directive
86 Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Keynote Speech at the EU Conference on
Privacy and Protection of Personal Data (Mar. 19, 2012); David Vladeck, Dir., Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Participant at the EU Conference on Privacy and
Protection of Personal Data (Mar. 19, 2012); Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy
& Identity Prot., Fed. Trade Comm'n, Participant at the EU Conference on Privacy and
Protection of Personal Data (Mar. 19, 2012); Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA), Co-Chair of Cong.
Privacy Caucus, Keynote Speech at the EU Conference on Privacy and Protection of
Personal Data (Mar. 19, 2012). These presentations are available at http://scic.ec.europa.eu/
streaming/indexh264.php?es=2&sessionno=0cdf61037d7053ca59347ab230818335.
2013] 1183
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
95/46 (with its primary sources in the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union).87 In Poland, such regulation is the Personal Data
Protection Act of 1997,88 implementing the norms of the Directive 95/46, with
its national basis in Article 51 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.89
The adoption of a relatively homogenous (omnibus) regulation, with a
consistent (which does not imply flawless) structure, is meant to facilitate
applying these norms in practice. This does not mean, however, that a particular
legal act does not stipulate different, usually enhanced, personal data protection
in specific areas.90
The American system is characterized by regulatory fragmentation
("patchwork," "kaleidoscopic," and "mosaic approach"), mainly because there
is no single fundamental legal act regulating the entire area of informational
privacy in a complex and framework manner. The exception to this rule is the
Privacy Act of 1974, which remains the fundamental legal act in the area of
privacy and personal data protection on the federal level, albeit limited in scope
to a certain area of the public sector; hence it is without a fully universal
character. 91
87Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2012 O.J. (C
326) 391; Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13; Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 25, 1957, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47; Irena Lipowicz,
Polska administracja publiczna w dwietle standard6w europejskich [Polish Public
Administration in View of European Standards], in PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE
[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 334, 344-45 (Zygmunt Niewiadomski ed., 2011) (translation
provided by author).
88 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie danych osobowych [Polish Data
Protection Act of 1997] (1997 r. Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 883 as amended).
89 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Constitution] Dz.U. 1997 Nr 78, poz. 483 (as
amended), Art. 41 (Pol.), translated at The Constitution of the Republic of Poland,
SEJM.Gov, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/konl.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2013).
9 0 Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications),
2002 O.J. (L 201) 37; Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
18 December 2000 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1; see also Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks cywilny [Polish
Civil Code 1964] (1964 r. Dz.U. Nr 16, poz. 93 as amended); Ustawa z dnia 22 maja 2003 r.
o dzialalnoici ubezpieczeniowej [Polish Insurance Act] (2003 r. Dz.U. Nr 124, poz. 1151 as
amended); Ustawa z dnia 16 lipca 2004 r. Prawo telekomunikacyjne [Polish
Telecommunications Act] (2004 r. Dz.U. Nr 171, poz. 1800 as amended); Ustawa z dnia 6
wrzeinia 2001 r. o dostqpie do informacji publicznej [Polish Freedom of Information Act]
(2001 r. Dz.U. Nr 112, poz. 1198 as amended).
91 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).
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Other federal informational privacy protection acts are sector-specific. 92
Such fragmentation of norms may theoretically result in difficulties in applying
them in everyday life.93
However, similar shortcomings are also inherent in the European legal
system, which I have encountered on numerous occasions in my legal practice.
In the section that follows, I will describe regulation methods in Europe
(including Poland) and in the United States.
2. Regulation Methods in the Model Approach
The European system of personal data protection is based on an
administrative method, characterized by the ability of neutralizing any
asymmetry among different entities. European literature explains that traditional
(civil and criminal law) data protection methods and mechanisms turned out to
be ineffective in their preventive function, hence the onus on protecting
individuals and their privacy is moving markedly towards institutional, public
law measures. 94 In other words, the administrative method is used when there is
a need to "level the playing field" and to lend support for formally weaker
92 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1778 (2012)); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9708 (2002)); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-227, 112 Stat. 2681-2728 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (2012)); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 and 42 U.S.C.); Drivers Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2102
(1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012)); Video Privacy Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 2710
(2006)); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646
(1988) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2006)); Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa
(2006)); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)); Fair Credit Reporting Act, ch. 41, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2012)); Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch.
2, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012)); Child Online
Protection Act (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681-736, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1998) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006)), invalidated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673
(2004); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy
Rules Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1035-36 (2013).
93 For similar views, see PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK
AND EU LAW xvii (3d ed. 2009); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A
Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. CoMM. L.J. 195, 208-09 (1992); see
also Priscilla M. Regan, The United States, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST
GENERATION, supra note 12, at 50, 74-76.
94 Safj an, supra note 11, at 5-7.
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players in their relations with authorities (vertical relations) or with other
formally more powerful entities, such as businesses (horizontal relations). The
elimination of imbalance is achieved mainly through the involvement and the
exercise of power by the state.95 Hence there is the presence of independent
personal data protection bodies in the European system, with supervisory and
ombudsman competencies (including the power to undertake actions to protect
individuals' interests). Such bodies may initiate actions ex officio, and apply
different sanctions. For example, the Polish Inspector General for the Protection
of Personal Data, although not vested with powers to impose financial
penalties, 96 may, among other powers, prohibit the transfer of personal data
from Poland to any third countries (including the United States) or order the
deletion of personal data.97 Such orders can obviously have a serious impact on
operations of businesses.
A different regulation method is used and popularized in the United States,
particularly in the vertical relations sphere, where the emphasis is on private law
mechanisms, including self-regulation and self-certification. 98 In this model,
authorities (particularly the judiciary) intervene in cases of a breach of accepted
practices only if the proceedings are initiated by an individual. In this model
generally there is no special body dedicated exclusively to personal data
protection (any specialized agencies act as organizational units of other bodies,
such as consumer protection agencies). 99 Such a regulation method stems from
the assumption that in a free market economy, private law measures, along with
judicial oversight of informational privacy protection, provide adequate
personal data protection. Nevertheless, the public law method can be observed
in the public sector.100
9 5 See, e.g., ZBIGNIEW LEONSKI, MATERIALNE PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE [MATERIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 12 (2000) (translation provided by author); EUGENIUSZ
OCHENDOWSKI, PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE, CZkIO OG6LNA [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
GENERAL PART] 35-36 (2000) (translation provided by author); HARTMUT MAURER,
OG6LNE PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE (ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT) 40 (2003); PRAwO
ADMINISTRACYJNE [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW], supra note 87, at 94; Gra2yna Szpor,
Publicznoprawna ochrona danych osobowych [Personal Data Protection in Public Law], 12
PRZEGLAD USTAWODAWSTWA GOSPODARCZEGO 2, 10 (1999) (translation provided by
author).
9 6 It can, however, refer cases to the public prosecutor's office, as violations of personal
data protection are a criminal offense subject to imprisonment of up to three years.
9 7 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o ochronie danych osobowych [Polish Data
Protection Act of 1997] (1997 r. Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 883, Art. 18.1, as amended).
9 8 SIRE & AHMAD, supra note 30, at 32-33.
99 See, e.g., state offices in California, where the Information Security Office is a part
of the California Department of Technology, the Office of Privacy Protection is a part of the
State and Consumer Services Agency, and the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection is
a part of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). See generally Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto
Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The "Soft elD"
Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335 (2013).
100 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)).
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3. Evaluation ofRegulation Methods in the Model Approach 0'
The method described above as "European" has its advantages. The
regulation is matter-of-fact, easy to navigate for individuals, relatively
transparent and homogeneous, offering support of specialized administrative
bodies dedicated exclusively to personal data protection. It also has its
shortcomings, which stem from its inflexibility, which in turn may limit
innovations in the economy. As is the case with all regulations in the fast-
changing economy, it is likely to result in normative gaps (given ongoing
technological developments impossible to foresee at the time a given regulation
is adopted), excessive discretionary powers granted to the personal data
protection body attempting to fill the said gaps, as well as low tolerance for
different legal solutions, considered a priori as less effective in protecting
personal data (which constitutes an evaluation method for European regulation,
rather than an inherent characteristic of such method).102 Moreover, we can
observe a growing trend of juridification of areas which until recently were free
from public interference,1 03 which is a tendency to regulate each sphere of life
by means of administrative regulations.
Among the advantages of the method described as "American" are
flexibility, which is conducive to the development of an innovative economy,
the ability to adapt to a fast-changing environment (including technological
advances),104 and leaving the power of initiative and freedom to individuals.
Among its drawbacks, we should include putting the onus of protecting their
rights on individuals, who, in the vast majority, have limited resources
(financial, technical, organizational, etc.) in comparison with administrative
authorities and business entities. In the U.S. model, there is also a risk of
passiveness toward violations of personal data processing rules that may result
from subjectively viewed harmlessness of individual informational privacy
breaches (individual breaches may seem negligible, but the accumulation
thereof, the so-called "aggregation effect," 05 is not). In addition, sector
regulation ("patchwork," "kaleidoscopic," and "mosaic approach") results in
101 For an in-depth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the regulation
models please see SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 30, at 30-44.
102Id. at 31.
103 Szpor, supra note 95, at 12.104 According to Polish scholar Roman Tokarczyk, common law "knows no normative
gaps, given that new cases result in new precedents," while in statutory law some normative
gaps are unavoidable. See ROMAN TOKARCZYK, WSP(LCZESNE KULTURY PRAWNE
[CONTEMPORARY LEGAL CULTURES] 143 (2010) (translation provided by author).
105 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING To HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURrY 27 (2011); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 44-47 (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 117-
21 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1184-95 (2002). This phenomenon is well illustrated
by the maxim "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."
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difficulties in everyday application of the law, 106 while self-regulation by
business entities may lead to personal data protection standards reflecting
business needs and interests, which often differ from those of individuals.10 7
4. Reasons Behind Regulatory Differences
As shown in my analysis, in spite of important similarities (or in some cases
virtual uniformity) of the fundamentals of both systems on the axiological
level, 08 there are significant differences on the level of specific regulations, as
summarized in the preceding section. As Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R.
Reidenberg rightly point out, although from the legal point of view personal
data protection in the EU and the United States may be identical in some cases,
the manner in which it is ensured is normally quite different. 109
In the European doctrine, personal data protection stems from the common
root of inalienable human rights and fundamental rights. Several authors when
referring to these rights within the context of the European regulations associate
them with "dignity," "respect," "honor," "inalienable rights," "dignitary
interests," "fundamental rights," "basic human rights," and "fundamental
human rights." 10 The reference to "dignity" is very significant, in my opinion.
To quote Marek Safjan, a distinguished Polish researcher and expert on the
subject, and the former President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, "dignity
is a primary right . . . [and] source of any and every other right."'I Privacy,
including informational privacy and personal data protection, should fall under
special protection because of its very nature and connection with the freedom
and right to self-determination of an individual.112 Because of historical,
cultural, and sociological factors, discussion on this subject in Europe is taking
place on the elementary values layer (such as dignity and freedom). European
10 6 For similar views, see CAREY, supra note 93; Reidenberg, supra note 93; see also
Regan, supra note 93.
107 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What
Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 19.
10 8 See supra Table 1.
109 SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 14, at 24-25, 342, 395-96.
110 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 15; Cate, supra note 12, at 179, 225-26;
Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A
Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. CoMP. L. 493, 562-63
(2007); Whitman, supra note 31, at 1161, 1214; Gabriela Zanfir, EU and US Data
Protection Reforms. A Comparative View, 7 EUR. INTEGRATION REALITIES & PERSP. 217,
217-19 (2012); Kobrin, supra note 12, at 27; Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene & Seda Gtirses,
Hero or Villain: The Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
923 (2013).
111 Safjan, supra note 32, at 227, 237.
ll 2 Marek Safjan, Prawo do ochrony tycia prywatnego [The Right to Protection of
Private Life], in HELSIsKiEJ FUNDACJI PRAW CZLOWIEKA [HELSINKI COMMITrEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS], SZKOLA PRAW CzLOWIEKA [HUMAN RIGHTS SCHOOL] 211, 212, 214, 222
(1996) (translation provided by author).
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sociology also regards the said values as fundamental.1 3 "The dignity of human
being" is treated as the "essence of human being . . . the cornerstone of the
entire constitutional order . . . basic norm (Grundnorm), and its source is
'humanness' per se." 1 4
In the United States, on the other hand, the issue of informational privacy is
linked with liberty values, understood not only as "freedom from" (surveillance
or interference of third parties), but also "liberty to" (actions, manifestations of
ingenuity).' ' The American legal system also recognizes fundamental values
and human rights.11 6 The most recent American literature in particular
recognizes privacy as a social good that contributes to the shaping of a
democratic civil society." 7 Nonetheless, the American system tends to take into
account purely practical, economic value of personal data, as an intangible,
legal value that may be subject to business transactions as an alienable
commodity." 8 Such a pragmatic point of view is also illustrated by Jerry L.
Mashaw, according to whom "[t]he question is not what rights are natural to
persons, but what rights persons must have to maintain a particular liberal and
democratic polity."ll 9
In my opinion, the source of the said differences is divergent views on the
role of an individual and his/her position in society, stemming from distinct
historical, social, and cultural experiences, as well as geographic location. This
dissimilarity, in my view, clearly affects specific regulations on personal data
(informational privacy) protection in Europe and the United States. Public law
regulation in Europe is protectionist and paternalistic, providing individuals
with care and protection ex officio. An individual, from the angle of European
experiences and conditions, is regarded as the subject of fundamental human
rights-vulnerable victim of potential abuse by the more powerful (including,
for example, authorities and/or business entities).
On the other hand, American informational privacy protection regulations
are characterized by their pragmatism and a pro-market approach. In the
American system, the individual is treated as a conscious participant in legal
and economic relations, or in other words, as a consumer. Consumers can seek
ll 3 Zygmunt Bauman, Professor, Postmodernistyczny obraz czlowieka w
spoleczefistwie. Gdzie fr6dla nadziei na lepszq przyszlo§d? [A Postmodern Image of a
Human Being in Society: Where Can Sources of Hope for a Better Future Be Found?]
(presented at Lecture at the IV Kongres Kultury Chrzeicija6skiej, Sept. 29, 2012).
114 Bartosz Wojciechowski, Prawa czlowiekajako element polityki wzajemnego uznania
Sr6wnosci szans [Human Rights as a Policy of Mutual Recognition and Equal Opportunity],
in KONWERGENCJA CZY DYWERGENCJA KULTUR I SYSTEM)W PRAWNYCH? 115 (Oktawian
Nawrot, Sebastian Sykuna & Jerzy Zajadlo eds., 2012) (translation provided by author).
115 Zanfir, supra note I10, at 218.
116 ANCEL, supra note 32, at 104.
1l 7 Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2163, 2180-82 (2003).
118 CRAIG & LUDLOFF, supra note 9, at 30, 50, 78-79; Kobrin, supra note 12, at 8, 23.
11 9 JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 169 (1985), quoted
in SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 14, at 65.
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their rights through the judicial system using legal instruments provided by the
state. This view of individuals and their position in the legal system is the
function and consequence of the basic principles on which the United States
was founded and developed.
a. Privacy Paradox No. ]
The above observations illustrate one of the privacy paradoxes, that is the
conclusion that, in spite of common axiological foundations and, in principle,
identical value systems, the normative solutions aimed at protecting such values
applied in different countries may be quite different.
The reasons behind these differences may stream from well-established
factors outside the legal system, such as historical, social, cultural, geographic,
or linguistic. Such factors and conditions result in different placement of
emphasis and priorities that subsequently are implemented by legislators in
order to protect fundamental, Western civilization values.
b. Privacy Paradox No. 2
The characteristics of the European and American personal data protection
systems presented above apply to traditional models, which in practice lose
their purity and absorb each other's features. For example, personal data
protection regulation in Europe loses its homogeneous character, and the area
becomes increasingly regulated by detailed regulations/legal acts (applying to a
specific sector). Thus the simplicity of the regulation is being lost, prompting
erosion of the system in this area. As noted by Irena Lipowicz, we are currently
witnessing the process of marginalization of the Act on Personal Data
Protection in Poland, which is no longer a bind holding the entire regulation as
one logical and coherent entity.120 We are therefore witnessing a fragmentation
and dispersal of regulation, which is characteristic of the American system.
Another trend that can be observed in Europe is the permeation of civil law
instruments into the traditional public law regulation. What I refer to are, for
example, co-regulative measures, such as the agreements between the Polish
Inspector General for the Protection of Personal Data and the Polish Association
of Direct Marketing (2008) or the Polish Automotive Industry Association
(2012), which outline the code of good business practices on personal data
protection in their respective sectors.121 Similar civil law measures are applied
120 Irena Lipowicz, Nowe wyzwania w zakresie ochrony danych osobowych [Personal
Data Protection: New Challenges], in INTERNET. OCHRONA WOLNOSCI, WLASNOSCI I
BEZPIECZENSTWA 3, 14 (Gratyna Szpor ed., 2011) (translation provided by author); see also
Wojciechowski, supra note 114, at 122-23.
121 GENERALNYM INSPEKTOREM OcHRONY DANYCH OSOBOWYCH, POROZUMIENIE
POMIEDZY GENERALNYM INSPEKTOREM OCHRONY DANYCH OSOBOWYCH A PREZESEM
POLSKIEGO ZWIAZKU PRZEMYSLU MOTORYZACYJNEGO [AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POLISH
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA AND THE AUTOMOTIVE
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on the EU level-for example, the model Standard Contractual Clauses or
Binding Corporate Rules,122 which provide for varying levels of involvement of
administrative bodies, are based on contractual schemes. Until quite recently,
solutions of such type were non-existent in the traditional, public model of
social regulations.
The American system is also undergoing noticeable changes, the most
important of which is the increased activity of the Federal Trade Commission in
the area of personal data protection. The FTC has demonstrated an inclination to
initiate proceedings ex officio, anticipating individual actions, which brings the
American model closer to the European one, increasing the degree of
protectionism. 123
The above observations lead me to another privacy paradox, which is the
conviction among the participants in the transatlantic debate of the superiority
of their respective systemic solutions. In reality, however, these solutions are
gradually evolving and the instruments of both legal cultures start to blend with
each other. Such process, although slow and long-lasting, is a manifestation of
the strength and "healthiness" of both legal systems, and constitutes a
legislative response to new challenges, particularly social phenomena arising
from the development of new technologies used for collecting and processing
personal data.124
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION] (Nov. 16, 2012), available at www.giodo.gov.pl/plik/idp/3068/
j/pU (translation provided by author).
122 Standard Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules are EU measures
designated to allow transfer of personal data from the territory of the EU to other countries,
such as the United States. For more information on the subject, please see SwIRE & AHMAD,
supra note 30, at 36-37.
1231 refer, in particular, to FTC proceedings against Google, Inc. and Facebook, Inc.,
which may be considered as actions on behalf of all consumers in the world. For more
information on this subject, please see Lesley Fair, Milking Cookies: The FTC's $22.5
Million Settlement with Google, BUREAU CONSUMER PROTECTION Bus. CENTER BLOG (Aug.
9, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://business.ftc.gov/blog/2012/08/milking-cookies-ftcs-225-million-
settlement-google; FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google's Rollout of Its
Buzz Social Network: Google Agrees To Implement Comprehensive Privacy Program To
Protect Consumer Data, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm; FTC Approves Final Settlement with
Facebook: Facebook Must Obtain Consumers' Consent Before Sharing Their Information
Beyond Established Privacy Settings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 10, 2012),
http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/facebook.shtm.
1241 refer to the already mentioned phenomena, such as Big Data and Open Data. See
e.g., Case C-138/11, Compass-Datenbank GmbH v. Republik Osterreich, 2011 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 0138 (July 12, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
documentprint.j sfdoclang--EN&text--&pagelndex=0&par=l 1 &mode=req&docid= 124999
&occ=first&dir--&cid=6123250; CRAIG & LUDLOFF, supra note 9, at 4; MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 9, at 2, 116; Kuner et al., supra note 9, at 47-48;
Marcinkowski & Kuca, supra note 9.
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III. IN SEARCH OF CONVERGENCE: A GLOBAL VISION OF PERSONAL DATA
PROTECTION
Given its importance in today's world, the controversial field of personal
data protection and transborder data transfers not only deserves attention, but
also requires transcontinental solutions.
For the last few decades, both Europe and North America have been
developing complex and diverging systems aimed at protecting the same
fundamental values. The overall regulations (acquis) and experience will not
allow any revolutionary changes to take place (such as the United States
adopting the EU Personal Data Protection Directive or the European Union
giving up institutional measures of the Directive 95/46 for the sake of self-
regulation). The political debate that is currently taking place suggests that
negotiations have arrived at the "point of no return" and the representatives of
both sides treat the negotiations as a matter of de facto non-negotiable
principles, as they consider them. Theoretically, interesting and particularly
innovative proposals, such as setting up a "National Information Market"1 25 or
introducing a system of licenses that authorize administrating computer
systems,126 have a slim chance of materializing.127
I am, therefore, inclined to propose developing solutions streaming from the
European and American laws and experiences. The starting point, in my view,
should be the realization of divergence of the current, respective personal data
protection systems and the emphasis on common values. Such understanding
would provide a stepping stone for a Euro-Atlantic personal data (informational
privacy) protection system, adopting a co-regulative method.
I assume that co-regulation stipulates a broad use of civil law mechanisms
and measures, along with public law mechanisms and solutions. Therefore,
codes of good practices drawn up by business circles (civil law element) should
fall under the supervision (at the project and implementation stage) of data
protection authorities or special agencies within the existing administrative
bodies providing public supervision and enforcement, also initiated ex officio. It
is also necessary to ensure effective international cooperation of the said
bodies, 128 at least within an informal trans-governmental administrative
network,129 ensuring the right for consumers to seek individual redress abroad.
125 Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 CoMM. ACM 92, 99-103 (1996).126 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIvACY 242-45 (1971).127 For a similar view, see Christopher Kuner, An International Legal Framework for
Data Protection: Issues and Prospects, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 307, 315 (2009).
128 For more on this subject, see SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 7, at 156-58.
129 SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 30, at 61; Christopher Kuner, Regulation of
Transborder Data Flows Under Data Protection and Privacy Law: Past, Present, and
Future 7-8 (Tilburg Inst. for Law, Tech. & Soc'y, Working Paper No. 016, 2010). It should
be noted that in the past, data protection bodies from the EU initiated proceedings in the
United States-for example, the German Federal Data Protection Commission carried out
such proceedings, with the consent of the company, at Citibank's headquarters. For more
1192 [Vol. 74:6
PRIVACY PARADOX(ES)
In the case of unavailability of civil law measures (such as codes of good
practices), international FIPPs principles would apply, established on the basis
of analytical comparisons, such as the one presented in Table 1, ensuring public
supervision and public enforcement.
It would also be appropriate to supplement the proposed model with the
principle of accountability and responsibility for data exporters. Such exporters
would be accountable for data processing by the importer abroad, including
possibly further processing in a way incompatible with initial purposes and
onward transfers.130 Additional features, such as Privacy by Default and Privacy
by Design, should be provided by technological measures. 131 I believe that in
this way we could achieve the interoperability of diverging systems.
I do not claim that the proposed solution would satisfy all needs. In my
opinion, however, it may be a starting point for reaching a solution that is
acceptable for all participants in the debate (an "imperfect agreement"), offering
a way out from a negotiating impasse.
If no constructive solution or concept of how to face Privacy Paradoxes is
offered, we will either face a standstill in the Euro-Atlantic economic, scientific,
and cultural relations (which I doubt),132 or our personal data protection will
only be superficial and illusory. In either of these cases, the fundamental Euro-
Atlantic values would come under a serious threat.
information, please see Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International
Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 227, 232-34 (2010).
13 0 See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW
173-74 (2013); Christopher Kuner, Developing an Adequate Legal Framework for
International Data Transfers, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 263, 269-72 (Serge
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009); Christopher Kuner, Global Data Transfers on the Internet:
Lessons from the Ancient World 5 (Aug. 4, 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1445458.
13 1 See WOJCIECH WIEwI6ROWSKI, GENERALNY INSPEKTOR OCHRONY DANYCH
OSOBOWYCH, NOWE EUROPEJSKIE REGULACJE W ZAKRESIE PRYWATNO CI W FAZIE
PROJEKTOWANIA I PRYWATNO CI W DOMY LNYCH USTAWIENIACH [NEW EUROPEAN
REGULATIONS ON PRIVACY BY DESIGN AND PRIVACY BY DEFAULT SETTINGS] (Mar. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.giodo.gov.plplik/idp/2646/j/pl/ (translation provided by author).
132 Particularly taking into account the proposed EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership. See European Comm'n, United States, COUNTRIES & REGIONS,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/ (last updated
June 18, 2013).
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